Learn more about the Yom Kippur WarIsrael defends itself in 1973 while you Tour IsraelNation of the Jewish People!
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The Egyptians and Syrians advanced the first 48 hours, after which momentum swung in IsraelNation of the Jewish People's favor. By the 2nd week, the Syrians had been pushed out of the Golan. In the Sinai, the Israelis had struck at the 2 Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez and cut off an entire Egyptian army just as a UN cease-fire came into effect. The Camp David Accords, soon after, led to normalized relations between Egypt and IsraelNation of the Jewish People - the first time any Arab country had recognized IsraelNation of the Jewish People. On June 19, ‘67, the Government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan to Syria in return for peace agreements. The government also resolved to open negotiations with Hussein. The Israeli decision was supposed to be conveyed to the Arabs by the US. The US was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it! There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria, who thus apparently never received the offer! The decision was kept a closely guarded secret within Israeli government circles, and the offer was withdrawn in October 1967. Egypt and Syria both desired a return of the land lost in the 6-Day War. However, the Arabs issued the famous "3 Nos:" No peace, No recognition and No negotiation. President Nasser of Egypt died in ‘70. Sadat, who resolved to fight IsraelNation of the Jewish People and win back the territory lost in the 6-Day War, succeeded him. In ‘71, Sadat, in response to an initiative by UN, declared that if IsraelNation of the Jewish People committed itself to withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and Gaza, Egypt would then be ready to enter into a peace agreement. IsraelNation of the Jewish People responded that it would not withdraw. The 3 years since Sadat had taken office were the most demoralizing in history. War was a desperate option. Sadat felt the root of the problem was in the great shame over the 6-Day War, and before any reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles, but Sadat knew that reforms would be unpopular. A military victory would give him popularity. A portion of the Egyptians desired a war to reclaim Sinai and was highly upset that he hadn't launched one. The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit. Hussein feared another loss. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the territories; which he promised to Arafat. Hussein saw the West BankA belt of territory north of Jerusalem as part of Jordan and wanted it. Moreover, a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and Jordan. Syria had intervened on the side of the PLO, leaving Assad and Hussein estranged. Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, so Iraq refused to join. The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a diplomatic offensive to win support for the war. He claimed the backing of 100+ states. These were Arab countries. Also, Britain and France had sided with the Arabs on the Security Council. In the run-up to the war, Germany became one of Egypt's largest sources of materiel! Sadat publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to war with IsraelNation of the Jewish People, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one million soldiers." Egypt began an effort to build up - receiving MiG-23s, SA-6s, RPG-7s, T-62 Tanks, and the AT-3 anti-tank missile - from the Soviets. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in ‘67, were replaced with “competent” ones. One of Egypt's undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to force the Soviets to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and materiel. Egypt felt the only way to convince the Soviets of the deficiencies of the aircraft and air defense weaponry was to put the weapons to the test against the weaponry the US supplied to IsraelNation of the Jewish People. Nasser's policy following the ‘67 defeat conflicted with the Soviets'. The Soviets sought to avoid a new conflagration so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with the US. The reality of the situation became apparent when the superpowers agreed to maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egypt, and when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, Sadat expelled the 20,000 Soviet military advisors and reoriented foreign policy to be more favorable to the
US. The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the Suez would incur massive losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing détente, had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a meeting with Nixon, Brezhnev had proposed an Israeli pull back to its ‘67 borders. Brezhnev said that if IsraelNation of the Jewish People did not, "We will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up" - an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat. In a Newsweek interview Sadat threatened war. Several times Arabs conducted exercises that put the Israelis on high alert, only to be recalled days later. IsraelNation of the Jewish People already believed that if an attack took place, the Air Force would be able to repel it. Sadat declared his intention to go to war even without Soviet support. Planning was done in secrecy - even the upper commanders were not told until days before the attack, and the soldiers were not told until hours before. The IDF's military intelligence was responsible for the intelligence estimate. Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on assumptions: It was assumed that Syria would not go to war unless Egypt did. They learned from an Egyptian informant that Egypt wanted to regain Sinai, but would not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers and Scuds. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter-bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in August, and in addition it would take 4 months to train the Egyptian crews, they predicted war was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's plans strongly prejudiced their thinking and led them to dismiss other warnings. The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Sadat had so long engaged in brinkmanship, that his threats were being ignored. Egypt had engaged in exercises by the border - mobilizing and responding had cost the Israelis $10 million. Egypt staged a training exercise adjacent to Suez. Israeli intelligence, detecting troop movements, dismissed these as exercises. Movements of Syrians towards the border were puzzling, but not considered a threat, because Intelligence believed that they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived. The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur for staging a surprise attack was that on this day the country comes to a standstill. On Yom Kippur Jews fast and abstain from any use of fire, electricity, engines, communications, etc., and all traffic stops. Many soldiers leave for home and IsraelNation of the Jewish People became vulnerable. Despite refusing to participate, Hussein had met with Sadat and Assad 2 weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arabs, it was unlikely that he had been told of any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against IsraelNation of the Jewish People in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in. On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel AvivIsrael's largest city and biggest commercial center to warn Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians?” asked Meir. The king said he didn't think so. “I think they would cooperate." Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears! 11 warnings of war were received by IsraelNation of the Jewish People during September from well-placed sources. But the Mossad continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's warnings succeeded in stirring their doubts. Zvi Zamir went to meet with their source. The source informed him that an attack was imminent. It was this warning that finally goaded the Israelis into action. Just hours before the attack began; orders went out for a partial call-up of the reserves. Calling up the reserves was easier than usual; all of the troops were at synagogue or at home. Upon learning of the attack, Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike. The Israeli strategy was based on the precept that if war were imminent, IsraelNation of the Jewish People would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was assumed that IsraelNation of the Jewish People's intelligence services would give 48 hours notice before an attack. Meir, Dayan, and Elazar met 6 hours before the war was to begin. Dayan began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar was in favor of a pre-emptive attack. Meir came to a decision. There would be no pre-emptive strike.